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Financial markets reveal what investors think about the future,
and prediction markets are used to forecast election results. Could
markets also encourage people to reveal private information, such
as subjective judgments (e.g., “Are you satisfied with your life?”)
or unverifiable facts? This paper shows how to design such mar-
kets, called Bayesian markets. People trade an asset whose value
represents the proportion of affirmative answers to a question.
Their trading position then reveals their own answer to the ques-
tion. The results of this paper are based on a Bayesian setup in
which people use their private information (their “type”) as a signal.
Hence, beliefs about others’ types are correlated with one’s own
type. Bayesian markets transform this correlation into a mechanism
that rewards truth telling. These markets avoid two complications of
alternative methods: they need no knowledge of prior information
and no elicitation of metabeliefs regarding others’ signals.
prediction markets | economic incentives | truth telling |
mechanism design | Bayesianism
When trading in a market or submitting a price to an auc-tioneer, people reveal the extent to which they value a
good. In finance, option and future markets reveal investors’
beliefs. Although such revelations of tastes and beliefs originally
were a by-product of regular markets, they have led to prediction
markets whose primary goal is to reveal beliefs. In such markets,
people can buy or sell a simple asset whose value is 1 unit (e.g.,
$10) if a specified event occurs and is 0 otherwise. Buying a unit
at a given price is a bet that the event is more likely than people
think to be on average. The resulting market price reveals ag-
gregate expectations. Prediction markets have been used by
various public organizations and companies (1, 2); for example,
social scientists use this type of market to predict the replicability
of experiments (3, 4). Prediction markets also have been shown
to outperform polls in predicting election results (5). Un-
fortunately, they can only be used for events whose occurrence
can be objectively verified. When collecting personal data such
as opinions and self-assessed measurements, objective verifica-
tion often is conceptually or practically impossible.
This paper introduces Bayesian markets, which are designed
to elicit private information in binary settings (yes-or-no ques-
tions) when objective verification is impossible. Bayesian mar-
kets rely on the assumption that the private information that
people possess influences their belief about others. Such in-
ference is justified by Bayesian reasoning, a widely used theory of
rational reasoning (6). Answering yes (Y) provides information
(a signal) that can be used to update one’s prior expectation
about the proportion of Y answers. In Bayesian markets, the
assets traded have a value determined by the proportion of Y
answers to a given question, for example, “Are you satisfied with
your life?.” Using Bayesian reasoning, we can predict that people
who actually answer Y will expect a higher asset value than those
who answer no (N). Hence, there exists a range of prices for
which Y people want to buy the asset and N people want to sell
it. In other words, for any price in this range, Y people bet that
the asset will be worth more than the price, and N people bet it
will be worth less. Bayesian markets use the difference in betting
behavior to provide incentives for people to tell the truth about
unverifiable information.
In prediction markets, betting on an event reveals one’s beliefs
about that event. In Bayesian markets, betting on how many
people are satisfied with their lives, for instance, reveals the
bettor’s beliefs about others’ life satisfaction, which in turn re-
veals the bettor’s own life satisfaction. Bayesian markets can also
be used to elicit people’s opinions about an event far in the fu-
ture, such as the very long-term consequences of climate change,
for which prediction markets are not adequate.
Bayesian markets complement alternative methods proposed
to elicit private information, which are the Bayesian truth serum
(7), the peer prediction method (8), and their refinements (9–
11). Bayesian markets share the same Bayesian setting with these
methods, notably the assumption that agents have a common
prior about the population. However, by using simple betting
decisions instead of eliciting a probability or estimating meta-
beliefs, Bayesian markets are simpler and more transparent than
these alternatives and are robust to certain deviations from the
common prior assumption (unlike refs. 7–10). They are re-
stricted to binary questions, however. After presenting the setup,
the main result, and an extension to small samples, I discuss
related literature and situations in which the required assump-
tions are satisfied.
The Agents and Their Information
There are n agents (referred to as “he” in the singular). Consider
a question Q about the agents’ private information, with two
possible answers f0, 1g to choose from. The type ti ∈ f0, 1g of
agent i∈ f1, . . . , ng corresponds to his truth, which is private
information. The proportion of type 1 agents is denoted
ω= ðPni=1ti=nÞ∈ ½0, 1. Following the literature (7–13), I assume
that it is common knowledge that all agents share a prior belief
f ðωÞ describing how likely they would consider various proportions
to be, had they not (yet) known their own type. Harsanyi (14)
provided justifications of this common prior assumption.
It is also common knowledge that types are impersonally in-
formative, as defined by Prelec (7): f ðωjtiÞ= f ðω

tjÞ is equivalent
to ti = tj. This property includes two aspects. First, types are im-
personal. That is, all agents i with ti = 0 have the same updated
belief f ðωjti = 0Þ, with expectations denoted ω0, and all agents j
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with tj = 1 have the updated belief f ðω

tj = 1Þ, with expectations
denoted ω1. Hence, the agent type includes all of the non-
common information. Second, types are informative [or “sto-
chastically relevant” (8)]. If agent i is of type 1, then because of
this signal, he will consider large proportions ω to be more likely
than he did a priori, and types 0 will consider them less likely, so
that ω1 >ω0.
Two convenience assumptions are made to keep the pre-
sentation of the main result simple: (i) There are infinitely many
agents, and (ii) f does not assign probability mass to the de-
generate distributions 0 and 1. That is, it is certain that there are
strictly positive proportions of both types of agents. These two
assumptions will be discussed after the main result.
The Market
A market is set up for Q, the question of interest. It is a one-shot
market in which all agents can simultaneously participate. The
agents are offered the possibility of trading an asset whose value
v will be the proportion of agents reporting 1. It is common
knowledge that agents maximize their subjective expected payoff
(what they expect to earn based on their beliefs) and only par-
ticipate in the market if they expect a strictly positive subjective
expected payoff. Agent i first reports his answer ri ∈ f0, 1g to
question Q. Then, a market price p is randomly, uniformly drawn
from the unit interval. Agent i is asked whether he wants to trade
at p. Specifically, he is asked whether he wants to buy if he
reported 1, and whether he wants to sell if he reported 0.
Implementing a random price in the market is a simple adap-
tation of a mechanism commonly used in experimental eco-
nomics to elicit people’s valuations of goods and assets (15). It
guarantees that the agents rely only on what they expect the
value of the asset to be because they cannot influence the market
price and there is nothing to learn from it.
Agents do not trade with each other but with a market maker
(referred to as “she”). However, whether the market maker buys
or sells with a given agent does depend on what the others do. If
a majority (taken as strict in this paper) of the agents reporting
1 is willing to buy, then the market maker buys from all of the
agents reporting 0 and willing to sell; otherwise, she does not
trade with the agents reporting 0. Symmetrically, if a majority of
the agents reporting 0 are willing to sell, then the market maker
agrees to sell to any agent reporting 1. The market maker trades
with both sides simultaneously. She ensures that all agents could
trade if they wanted, even if the number of buyers and sellers
differs. Although it is important for the result to come that the
market maker’s actions are based on the agents’ decisions, all
results of this paper and of Supporting Information would still
hold if we replace majority by unanimity. The main result would
also hold for any strictly positive threshold, for instance requiring
one-third of agents willing to trade. However, from an imple-
mentation perspective, the majority rule is less sensitive to ex-
treme behavior or the mistakes of a few agents than unanimity,
and it is more natural than other thresholds.
Having collected all reports, the market maker determines the
settlement (or liquidation) value v, which is defined as the pro-
portion of 1 among the reports ri. Because there are infinitely
many agents, no one can influence the settlement value on his
own. As in prediction markets, when the value of the asset is
known, the market stops and payment occurs. Buyers of the asset
receive the settlement value from the market maker and sellers
give it to the market maker. Hence, agent i’s net payoff is v− p if
he bought the asset, p− v if he sold it, and 0 if he did not trade.
Main Result
The theorem below establishes that truthful reporting, defined as
ri = ti for all agents i, provides a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This
means that, given that everyone else is telling the truth, no agent
wants to lie. The next paragraph clarifies this statement by
providing the proof of the theorem.
I first assume that all agents participate in the market. We will
later see that all expected payoffs are strictly positive, ensuring
that the agents indeed will participate. Consider agent i and as-
sume that all other agents report the truth, which implies v=ω.
Type 1 agents become buyers and will agree to buy if the market
price p is less than their expectation of the asset value ω1. Sim-
ilarly, type 0 agents become sellers and will sell if the market
price exceeds ω0. By assumption, it is certain that there are both
types of agents and the market maker will trade with all agents
who want to if a majority on each side wants to trade. Hence,
trades will occur if and only if ω0 < p<ω1. What should agent i
do? If his type is 1, he expects the asset to be worth ω1. To make
a profit as a seller, he would only sell if the market price exceeds
ω1, but no trades will occur at such a high price. However, he is
willing to buy up to a market price of ω1. He therefore expects to
trade and make a profit if the market price is between ω0 and ω1.
To reap this payoff, he must first report 1 and hence be truthful.
He can then expect to receive
R ω1
ω0
ðω1 − pÞdp= ððω1 −ω0Þ2=2Þ> 0,
that is, a payoff of ω1 − p for all market price p between ω0 and ω1.
So-called mixed strategies (defined as reporting 1 with some
probability and 0 otherwise) make no sense because they only
decrease the probability of reaping the payoff. The proof that
truth telling is best for a type 0 agent is symmetric, and the
expected payoff is the same, thus proving the Theorem.
Theorem. In a Bayesian market, truthful reporting is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Interestingly, Bayesian markets also prevent (degenerate)
equilibria in which everyone reports the same answer. If all
agents were to decide to report 0, then no trades would occur;
there would be no buyers, and therefore, no strict majority of
buyers willing to trade. All agents would end up with 0 and
therefore would not participate. The same holds if all agents
were to decide to report 1. Hence, there is no Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in which agents participate and all report the same.
The equilibrium in which no agents participate (and therefore all
get 0) is dominated by participation and truthful reporting be-
cause the latter gives a strictly positive expected payoff.
As we have seen, all agents expect a strictly positive payoff.
This expectation is only possible because the market maker
subsidizes the market. At the equilibrium and if p falls between
ω0 and ω1, she will pay ðω− pÞ to ωn buyers and receive it from
ð1−ωÞn sellers. Hence, the ex post cost will be either 0 or
nð2ω− 1Þðω− pÞ, which is bounded below by −ðn=8Þ and above
by n (Supporting Information). The maximum relative cost of
1 per agent can become problematic in an absolute sense for very
large samples.
Until now, we assumed that both types were present with
certainty, but we can relax this assumption and only exclude
some degenerate cases. It is enough to require that there is no
x∈ ð0,1Þ such that f ð0Þ+ f ðxÞ+ f ð1Þ= 1. Supporting Information
proves the theorem under this assumption. In the present setup,
the market price is randomly determined from a uniform dis-
tribution. Any other distribution whose density is strictly positive
for all values in ð0, 1Þwould work as well. A distribution ensuring
that agents are often rewarded can help them to quickly learn the
best strategy (16).
Adaptation to Small Samples
Although an infinite number of agents was assumed for mathe-
matical simplicity, a simple modification makes Bayesian mar-
kets work even for small samples. A minimum of four agents is
required. To prevent an agent’s own report from influencing the
asset value he is betting on, the market maker simply buys and
sells individualized assets whose value will be the proportion of
1 answers reported by three randomly selected other agents












(hence, excluding the agent’s own report). This adaptation is
inspired from peer prediction mechanisms (8–10).
The market maker provides the additional guarantee that the
trade is canceled if the three other agents, whose answers an
agent is betting on, are of the same type, that is, she will neither
buy nor sell if v= 0 or v= 1. The agent then knows that if he
trades, v is either 1=3 or 2=3. If he assumes everyone else is
telling the truth, he expects EðvjtiÞ= ð1+ωtiÞ=3 (Supporting In-
formation). Type 1 agents will therefore expect a higher asset
value than type 0 agents, and the optimal strategy remains
truthful reporting.
Related Literature
Prediction markets are popular for eliciting people’s beliefs (1–
5) because they only rely on simple betting decisions. However,
they are restricted to beliefs about objectively verifiable events.
Bayesian markets are as close as possible to prediction markets
in terms of simplicity but extend their domain to unverifiable
subjective data and beliefs about unverifiable events.
Since the 1980s, various Bayesian revelation mechanisms have
been proposed (7–13). Some mechanisms were especially
designed for data collection methods such as surveys. The peer
prediction mechanism (8) assumes that the investigator actually
knows the common prior (estimated, for instance, from pre-
viously collected data). An agent’s answer is then used to update
the prior and to reward the agent based on the performance
of the obtained posterior in predicting what another agent an-
swered. Other peer prediction mechanisms also require knowing
(in practice: estimating) some forms of metabeliefs, for instance
about type correlations between tasks (17). In practical imple-
mentations, the payment rule may not be transparent to the
respondents because it is based on additional assumptions or
estimations. Bayesian markets avoid this issue at the cost of
asking for a betting decision. Moreover, in Bayesian markets,
degenerate equilibria are dominated by truth telling, unlike in
many peer prediction mechanisms (17).
The Bayesian truth serum (7) and its refinements (9–11), like
Bayesian markets, do not require the investigator to know the
prior beliefs of the agents. This feature makes the Bayesian truth
serum implementable in previously unasked questions. It has
been used, for instance, in recognition tasks (18) or in evaluating
the prevalence of scientifically questionable practices (19). The
Bayesian truth serum and its refinements work as follows. Agents
must first answer a question but then must also report a pre-
diction of the rate of each possible answer. Predicting the rate of
an answer can be a difficult task for the general population,
because it involved probabilistic reasoning. The agents’ score is
then based on two components: whether their own answer oc-
curred more often than predicted on average and whether their
prediction was accurate. This accuracy is typically measured with
a logarithmic or quadratic distance measure (scoring rule). The
payment with the Bayesian truth serum is difficult for respon-
dents to understand, to the point that it was not even explained
in most applications. Bayesian markets have three advantages
over the Bayesian truth serum and its refinements: (i) simple
betting decisions are more natural to laypeople than scoring
rules; (ii) people do not have to report a prediction (a value) in
Bayesian markets, but only have to make a binary decision (trade
or not); (iii) the final payment is more transparent, and anyone
can compute it. Point ii makes clear that Bayesian markets are
not a special case of the Bayesian truth serum and its refine-
ments because they require less information.
Unlike the Bayesian truth serum, Bayesian markets are as yet
restricted to binary settings. This restriction can be problematic
even for binary questions if, for instance, the population consists
of experts and nonexperts. Then there are four types (expert and
yes, expert and no, nonexpert and yes, nonexpert and no), vio-
lating the assumptions of Bayesian markets. The Bayesian truth
serum solves this problem by asking a question with the four
types as possible answers (7). Because markets only have buyers
and sellers, they cannot accommodate questions with more than
two answers. Although a question with more than two answers
can be reformulated as a series of binary questions, having
multiple markets related to the same initial question can create
dependencies that affect the agents’ optimal strategy. There is a
solution if a researcher is only interested in the proportion of
each answer and has access to a sufficiently large sample. For a
question with k possible answers, she can split the sample into
k− 1 groups. Each group participates in only one market related
to the question, “Is your answer h?” for h from 1 to k− 1. Each
agent only considers one market, and the results of the present
paper may apply. The researcher can then recompose the full
distribution of answers.
On a technical level, the presence of the market maker pre-
vents agents from relating the likelihood of trading to the actual
ω and thus avoids the no-trade theorem (20). Indeed, in a pure
Bayesian setup, if an agent knows that he trades with an agent
from the opposite type, then they both learn the type of the
opposite party and end up with the same posterior. The market
maker prevents this learning from occurring and therefore has an
important role in keeping the agents’ type private until the set-
tlement value is determined. This is why Bayesian markets, as
proposed in this paper, are one-shot markets in which all agents
act simultaneously. One may wonder whether sequential or dy-
namic versions are possible. Such versions would require solving
the challenge of preserving some degree of privacy, a similar
problem as the one highlighted by Cummings et al. (21). If
agents’ types are constant, simply revealing the number of buyers
and sellers immediately reveals v and therefore ω (at the equi-
librium). Once ω is known, there is no profit to expect from
trading because everyone agrees and there is no longer a role for
Bayesian markets.
Discussion of the Assumptions
Bayesian markets perfectly reveal beliefs whenever the assump-
tions are perfectly satisfied. In applications, the assumptions will
be violated to some extent. Then, the mechanism of Bayesian
markets induces people to move closer to speaking the truth to
the extent that its assumptions hold approximately, where the
common prior assumption and the sensitivity of information are
most important. Noise and biases remain to the extent that as-
sumptions are violated. I next discuss violations of the various
assumptions in detail.
The theoretical literature on Bayesian mechanisms discussed
above relies heavily on the existence of a common prior. Relaxing
the common prior assumption is not an easy task and requires
specifying how much agents know about others’ beliefs about
types. A refinement of the Bayesian truth serum (11) allows priors
to vary; however, agents should still expect their posterior to be
closer to the posterior of the other agents sharing their type than
to any opposite-type agents. In Supporting Information, it is shown
that Bayesian markets are robust to deviations from the common
prior under a similar assumption as in ref. 11. Such a robustness
result is important because the common prior assumption is un-
likely to perfectly hold in practice. Still, Bayesian markets rely on
beliefs being strongly influenced by agent types. Questions that the
agents never asked themselves (and their relatives) are more likely
to satisfy this requirement. For practical implementation, it is
desirable that respondents have little reason to believe that others
have different priors.
There is ample evidence that people deviate from Bayesian
updating in the psychology literature (22). The crucial implica-
tion of Bayesian updating for us is that posteriors are correlated
with types (ω1 >ω0). First, deviations from Bayesian updating
such as the confirmation bias (23) will not reverse this correla-
tion. Second, and more importantly, correlations between one’s
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own truth and beliefs about others have been robustly observed in
various domains of behavior, feelings, and thoughts (24, 25). Such
correlations, initially seen as a bias and called the false-consensus
bias, were later reconciled with Bayesianism (6). People can still
improve their predictions of others’ behavior by weighting their
own behavior more heavily (26). Even if a bias exists, it points in
the same direction as Bayesianism and therefore supports the
mechanism on which Bayesian markets rely.
An example of applications in which Bayesian markets will not
work well concerns questions about shameful behavior; in this
regard, people may exhibit a different bias known as pluralistic
ignorance. They then neglect the extent to which people deviate
from social norms when predicting others’ answers (27). Plural-
istic ignorance concerns average beliefs, whereas the false con-
sensus bias concerns beliefs of one group relative to another. The
two phenomena may occur simultaneously (27), but it remains
safer not to implement Bayesian markets in domains in which
pluralistic ignorance has been identified. The belief assumptions
of Bayesian markets would also be violated if some agents view
themselves as fundamentally different from the others. Because
of idiosyncratic tastes or specific political views, they may expect
their answers to be negatively correlated with the answers of
the others.
For the Bayesian market to work, agents should use Bayesian
Nash equilibria. Empirical studies have found that people may
deviate (28), although deviations are reduced by learning (16).
Hence, it will be useful to explain the desirability of equilibrium
to agents. For instance, an agent can be told that being the only
one to deviate from truth telling will reduce his expected payoff.
As is common in games using language to coordinate, there is
another Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which 1 can be interpreted
as meaning 0 and conversely. Expected payoffs would remain
unchanged. The problem with this approach is that agents can
only adopt it if all others also do so in a coordinated action;
however, such coordination is difficult to imagine. The natural
first answer coming to mind in this game is the true answer.
Agents are aware that this also occurs for other agents. Hence,
truthful answering is the most natural procedure for coordination,
making it a focal equilibrium (ref. 29; see also ref. 30). The ex-
clusion of degenerate equilibria reduces the set of candidates for
focal points, making truth telling the most convincing one. Hence,
the Theorem implies that Bayesian markets induce truth telling.
By rewarding truth telling, Bayesian markets motivate re-
spondents to think deeply about their answers. Bayesian markets
provide incentives to tell the truth when agents do not have any
other incentives. They reduce the effect of opposite incentives
(interests to lie) if there are other incentives, but the outcome
then is uncertain. In such cases, Bayesian markets are less ef-
fective (i) the more the respondents are suspicious that their
answers may be used against them, (ii) when the information is
so sensitive that the payoff does not compensate the cost of
admitting the truth, and (iii) when the respondents expect others
to report untruthfully for strategic reasons even if they them-
selves would not.
Truth-telling incentives show that a carefully considered and
honest answer is important to the researcher. If the researcher
fears that providing monetary incentives crowds out respondents’
intrinsic motivation, the latter can be reinforced by transferring
incentives to charity giving as in ref. 19.
Application Domains
In summary, Bayesian markets are especially useful for private
information that is not sensitive but that does require effort from
the respondents. In health studies and in social and human sci-
ences, it is common to ask respondents to evaluate various as-
pects of their lives (health, well-being, life satisfaction, etc.) or to
remember and report certain past actions. For such questions,
respondents may not have any reason to deliberately lie but also
have little reason to think deeply about each answer. Truth-
telling incentives help motivate them to provide careful answers.
Bayesian markets can solve a central problem in experimental
economics. Although providing monetary incentives is a cor-
nerstone of experimental economics, experimenters often also
collect nonincentivized survey data to complement the main
choice data of their experiments. It is therefore salient that this
survey part is not incentivized, thereby jeopardizing the quality of
the data. Bayesian markets can help incentivize what is not in-
centivized so far, such as simple personality questionnaires.
Bayesian markets offer an alternative to prediction markets
when the event to predict cannot be verified in the lifetime of the
forecaster (for instance, whether extraterrestrial life will be dis-
covered before the year 2200 or whether climate change will be-
come a serious problem for future generations). Other events that
cannot be observed and that therefore are unsuited for prediction
markets are counterfactual events. In Bayesian markets, experts
can be incentivized to predict, or rather conjecture, what could
have occurred, such as whether an alternative action would have
yielded a better outcome than the action that was implemented.
Answering such a question requires effort, and if not too sensitive
or strategic, is suited for Bayesian markets. Here, again, experts can
be rewarded for reporting what they truly believe even when we
can never check whether they are right.
Conclusion
Through Bayesian markets, researchers interested in the answer to
a question can become market makers to incentivize truth telling.
The market maker subsidizes the market and ensures that all
agents can expect a strictly positive profit. Currently, social scien-
tists and companies often simply reward agents for completing
surveys. Using Bayesian markets, they can reallocate resources to
rewarding truth telling in a simpler and more transparent way than
would be possible with alternative solutions.
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